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28 July 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT : Planning.

REFERENCE : Draft memorandum dated 23 July 1953 for the DCI, same subject.

The following comments, corresponding to paragraph numbers in your memorandum, are furnished in accordance with your request:

1. OK.

2. a. True, but these are relatively short-range problems and, for the most part, problems which require command decisions. In most instances, wouldn't it be entirely too slow to refer these matters to a planning staff, and aren't they, for the most part, problems which are entirely proper to refer directly to a Deputy for further coordination and action or recommendation?

b. In its present method of operation I don't really believe that the Project Review Committee can properly be called a "planning body." The Committee reviews plans but does not originate them and, for the most part, reviews a lot of individual projects and programs without analyses of the total Agency plans and programs, and, frankly, I think, usually without very thorough appreciation and understanding as to how the individual projects or programs fit into the whole.

c. OK.

d. True, but can't this be accomplished now by cooperation among Deputy Directors, the Assistant Director (Communications) and the Director of Training? I think that it can.

e. While I think that the Office of Intelligence Coordination is much more than an "office of record," I generally agree with your comments that it is "neither properly located nor properly constituted."

f. While a "planning staff" could handle the personnel ceiling problem (and, certainly, its plans for Agency operations and activities would have a major bearing on the decisions made), I do not be-

SECRET

Security Information

lieve that a "planning staff" is essential to solve this type of problem and it is not the type of thing to which it would contribute most.

If we had a firm set of operational and intelligence plans approved by the Director, the adjustment of personnel allocations and ceilings shouldn't be too complicated. The trouble is that we don't have any firm plans. Everybody is just expanding! If we had plans as to how much we proposed to beef up FI during the next two years, where OHR is going, PP, etc., for example, we would have some pattern into which to build with whatever personnel ceiling we had. This is the pattern which I would hope to see a "planning staff" build.

I agree that the reduction in the intelligence functions of State would be appropriate for the "planning staff" to consider, but, here again, if we had good, sound, long-range plans, these decisions shouldn't be too difficult to make and would not require very much planning at the time.

- 5. OK; except I'm not sure that an "individual" with a small secretariat can do the job.
- 3. a. Again, I think that even with the best planning board most of the things coming up at Deputies' Meetings which require the Director's decisions would come up anyway because they are things which require fairly quick command decisions and which specifically could not be anticipated by a planning board.

The Berlin Blockade for example: While the advice and assistance of the "planning staff" would be extremely helpful, it would seem to me that this is the type of situation in which (assuming that a plan had not already been developed and approved) the DCI or the D/DCI would want to take personal command in order to insure that everything possible was being done to meet the situation. Here again, I visualize the planning staff as being primarily engaged in the longer range planning as opposed to that meeting the "crash" type of situation.

- b. OK.
- c. OK.
- d. OK, but a planning board shouldn't be necessary to accomplish this.
- e. OK.

SECRET

- 4. a. OK.
- b. OK.
- c. OK. However, I am not sufficiently up to date on all of the things that OIC is doing. It might well be that some of these functions should remain with the DD/I.

GENERAL:

My concept of the function of a "planning staff" would be to emphasize the long-range aspects of planning and not what I view as relatively short-range operating problems. Assuming that our expansion in the foreseeable future is going to be extremely limited, where are we going? From where do we need information most? How are we going to try to get it, etc.? Where should we concentrate our PI and PP activities? What types of activities have the greatest chances of success, etc.?

If we had a careful analysis of these and many other questions we should be able to determine what we should, or, at least, would like to do. Turning to our assets and potential we should be able to predict with some degree of accuracy what we could do. On balance then, we should be able to produce some plans as to what we are going to do, not just tomorrow, but in 1955, 1956, 1957, etc. Plans should, of course, be under constant review to keep them up to date in the light of changing conditions and, of course, our war planning should be tied in with the Department of Defense as closely as possible.

I frankly believe that this is the type of planning for which we need a staff. I am not at all sure that it would ever produce long-range plans or even be an asset if it injected itself very deeply into the day-to-day and short-range operating problems, although I firmly believe that it has to be aware of these problems.

15/
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(Administration)

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